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Contributory negligence is certainly not a very popular doctrine
today. Assaults upon it are fast becoming commonplace, and I
suspect that any serious defender of contributory negligence faces
the risk of being branded as a reactionary. Indeed, most of the
apologies that have been offered in behalf of the doctrine are thin
and non-persuasive. It has not, however, been utterly devoid of
effective championship. Sixty years ago Francis Bohlen offered the
only rationale of contributory negligence that strikes me with a true
ring of conviction.' Directing himself first to the ideas of assumption
of risk and consent, Bohlen observed:
The state has no interest in [the individual's] getting the utmost benefit
from his merely private rights. It protects him in his right to do what he
pleases with them-so it prohibits their invasion without his consent-it does
not attempt to protect him from his own folly in dealing with them.2
The common law with which Bohlen was dealing in 1908 was sharply
individualistic. Anyone-rich or poor, capable or incapable, suspicious
or gullible-was free to toss his rights deliberately to the wind if he
so chose. Hence, volenti non fit injuria. However this may be, mere
careless self-exposure to danger, if it were to upset recovery in an
otherwise appropriate case, would require that the law demonstrate
its individualist point of view even further. This, Bohlen pointed
out, significantly, is what it does. "It throws on the individual the
primary burden of protecting his own interest. The courts are the
last resort of him who not merely does not, but cannot, protect him-
self."3
Under this view, contributory negligence is something more than
a mere distorted anomaly in delictual law. Instead, as Bohlen ob-
serves, "This conception is part of the very atmosphere of English
legal thought-it is not peculiar in the law of tort to negligence alone,
nor is it even confined to the law of torts."4
This stands in sharp contrast with the shallow but frequently
voiced apology that the object of the defense of contributory negli-
gence is to visit appropriate retribution on the careless victim and
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School. A.B. 1928, J.D.
1931 University of North Carolina; LL.M. 1933, Harvard University. Advisor to
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1. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HAnv. L. REv. 233 (1908).
2. Id. at 252.
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to prevent his profiting from his own wrongdoing. For Bohlen it is
no such thing. It is, rather, one device among many for giving effect
to the sharply limited character of the duties owed for the protec-
tion of others. "[Each individual is] his own first bulwark against
outside interference, and . . . the function of remedial law takes
on where the power of self-protection ceases." 5 The same limitation
that finds its voice in contributory negligence can be expressed from
the defendant's viewpoint by the observation that the full extent of
the defendant's duty of due care is to abstain from harmful conduct
under such circumstances that the victim may be denied his usual
capacity to protect himself; but so long as the latter is not deprived
of his normal ability to watch out for his own safety, he has not
suffered a legally compensable harm at the hands of the defendant.
Of course, we do not necessarily bolster the case for contributory
negligence or render it less impervious to criticism merely by shifting
the rationale behind it. As a matter of fact, we may even sharpen
the hostility toward the defense by suggesting that the doctrine be
stamped with the label of nineteenth century individualism, rather
than. being regarded merely as an awkward way of handling the situ-
ation where bad man meets bad man. I suggest, however, that by
shifting the rationale to the broader policy base, we invite a new
appraisal of the arguments both favoring and disparaging contribu-
tory negligence. If its weakness is rooted in the fact that it rests
upon the same (possibly discreditable) foundation of individualism
that underlies the entire torts system, it cannot be readily loosened
at will from the remaining mass of individualistically oriented tort
law and singled out for special attack.
Again, our assumption concerning the basic policy that underlies
contributory negligence may influence us to accept or to reject the
competing device of comparative negligence. So long as the problem
is conceptualized in terms of what to do when plaintiff's misbehavior
and defendant's similar misbehavior collide and bring about a single
loss, we may be attracted by the possibility of reconciling the two
wrongs through an adjustment of damages. Hence we would look
with favor upon some comparative negligence scheme or other. If,
however, the significant problem is solely one of determining the out-
side limits of the duty that the defendant should be required to
shoulder, the solution of comparative negligence may seem a bit
absurd. A duty approach, such as Bohlen's, suggests that the pros-
pect of the plaintiff's own heedlessness should be either wholly pro-





Quite apart from contributory negligence, duty-limiting devices that
take the victim's behavior into account are familiar in suits against
occupiers of premises. The licensee or social guest cannot recover
for an injury resulting from some danger which he would have dis-
covered for himself had he been alert.6 The occupier's duty is merely
to warn or to make reasonably certain that the defect is an obvious
one. In such cases any suggestion that a fair adjustment could be
made by allowing the heedless guest 25 cents on the dollar for his
loss would sound strange, indeed, to the common law ear. The situ-
ation is the same with reference to the rights of the gratuitous pas-
senger in an automobile, 7 and until fairly recently, there could be no
recovery by even the business patron for defects on the premises
which would be obvious to a reasonably alert person.8
One characteristic common to all the situations described above is
the fact that attention is centered upon the question of whether ad-
vance preparation should be demanded of the defendant who makes
his property or facilities available to others. The decisions, in effect,
deny that there is any affirmative duty to make the surroundings
safe. A complex of duty language, talk about causation, and affirma-
tive defenses such as assumed risk and contributory negligence all
serve somewhat indiscriminately to protect the defendant, and the
choice of doctrine may be largely a matter of personal preference or
result from some fortuity in the pleadings. One judge may stress
that the occupier or owner owed only a duty to avoid concealment
of the defects on his premises or in his vehicle; another may empha-
size that the plaintiff was aware of the danger and assumed the risk,
or that the accident must be attributed to his heedlessness as the
responsible cause; while a third judge may direct the jury to return
a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. But whatever the rationale
may be, recovery should be denied so long as legal policy tolerates
this limited view of the defendant's obligation. It is difficult to dis-
cover any role here for an adjustment in terms of the amount of
damage to be awarded.
It is important to note that with respect to injuries to the business
guest or invitee the law's demands upon the occupier have become
considerably more exacting in recent years. The proprietor who throws
his premises open indiscriminately to the public is no longer privileged
to rely upon his guests to watch out for themselves. The host must
now take reasonable steps to obviate dangers which he should expect
6. RST TEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 341A, 342.
7. PROSSER, TORTS 392 (3d ed. 1964).
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 343 (c) (ii).
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the patron to encounter despite their obviousness.9 We are here say-
ing, in effect, that the prospect of customer heedlessness in appropriate
cases may be a risk that is wholly embraced within the scope of the
duty properly owed by the defendant. Whenever this is the case,
the guest should recover the full amount of his damage. If the
customer's carelessness is a risk against which the proprietor must
afford affirmative protection, we can hardly justify trimming down
the amount of recovery because the customer failed to use reasonable
care.
Again, even where it is clear that the proprietor owes an affirmative
duty to prepare for the reception of customers, the extent of the
preparation expected of him is limited by the dictates of reasonable-
ness. It follows that unless the host is expected to provide a fool's
paradise, he should be entitled to anicipate some modicum of in-
telligent cooperation on the part of the guest. The patron, for ex-
ample, who walks backward along a store aisle until he finally reaches
a place where he falls down an open stairwell should clearly be denied
recovery for the simple reason that no storekeeper should be expected
to provide a safe haven against risks of this character. No damages
whatsoever should be awarded when it is found that the defendant's
conduct measures up to the standard of reasonable care.
This writer cannot escape the impression that the parent of all
contributory negligence cases, Butterfield v. Forrester,10 is, in truth,
only an illustration of an extravagant risk created by the plaintiff's
conduct. Here, it will be recalled, Forrester had allowed a pile of
timber to lie in a public road in such a position as to partially obstruct
passage. Sufficient room was left, however, so that the ordinarily alert
traveler could pass safely and without serious inconvenience. The
obstruction was visible for one hundred yards. At twilight young
Butterfield, returning from the town tavern, was pressing his horse
violently. In his heedlessness he failed to observe the timber and ran
his steed against it. A denial of recovery was entirely to be expected,
and the only novel feature of the case was Ellenborough's historic
pronouncement that in order for a plaintiff to recover it must appear
that he himself was without fault. It should be borne in mind that
the suit was essentially for a public nuisance which would exist only
if there were an unreasonable interference with the public right.
Forrester's obstruction was probably no substantial frustration of the
travel needs of the ordinary highway user. Travelers during this
period in English history were fortunate if the public highways were
even passable. Butterfield's extravagant horsemanship demanded more
9. RESTATEfENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 343A.
10. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
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in the way of road safety than he was entitled to at that time.
Perhaps the above rambling observations betray the fact that I am
somewhat concerned over the prospect of regarding the negligence
of the tort victim universally as a matter merely to be considered in
reduction of damages. As I see it, the plaintiff's own conduct rep-
resents an aspect of the torts controversy that may exert its influence
upon the character of the duty owed by the defendant, or upon the
issue of his negligence, or upon the nature of the risk for which he
should be made answerable. There are times when the plaintiff's
carelessness should be wholly ignored. There are other times when
it must be regarded as a risk factor that should preclude recovery
entirely.
At still other times it is equally clear that the victim's fault should
serve only to mitigate his damages. Characteristic of this class of situ-
ations are cases arising from the operation of motor vehicles. The
human failings upon which attention is focused in the typical traffic
cases are those involving active misconduct at the very scene of the
tragedy, and the observation, alertness, coordination, responsiveness,
and judgment of both parties is sharply involved. Characteristically,
both the victim and the alleged wrongdoer are in motion simul-
taneously, and, at least whenever a collision of vehicles is involved,
both litigants are engaged in conduct that exposes them mutually
to the risk of injury or death. Hence, personal behavior is dramatically
prominent in these cases, and the impact of personal fault upon
personal fault is vivid. The urge to compare the respective behavior
of the parties and to adjust damages accordingly is likely to be com-
pelling in this type of litigation.
Certainly the comparative approach is the attack that would be
favored by the layman. Forty years ago an experienced trial judge
observed that "juries have knocked this theoretical law of contributory
negligence into a cocked hat .... Anyone with open eyes directed
either to the front or to the rear, can plainly see that, on this point
at least, the living law is jury-made far more truly than it is judge-
made."" Speaking of contributory negligence as early as 1934, Pro-
fessor Charles Lowndes noted that "this tall timber in the legal jungle
has been whittled down to toothpick size by the sympathetic sabotage
of juries."'
There is every reason to believe that judges not only are aware of
the consistent jury tendency merely to compare fault in fixing the
11. UL rAN, A JuDGE TAKEs Thm STAND 31 (1932). The writer's interest in this
statement prompted him to inquire of other trial judges seeking their reactions to
Judge Ulman's observation. The results will be found in Malone, Contributory Negli-
gence and the Landowner Cases, 29 Mn . L. Rlv. 61, 64-66 (1945).
12. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Geo. L.J. 674 (1934).
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damage award, but likewise generally approve of it. They appear
to be content with the practice of instructing the jury one way while
confidently expecting it to disregard what it was told to do. Why,
then, do courts consistently adhere to contributory negligence in their
formal pronouncements and refuse to acknowledge openly an approach
which they privately condone? The answer, I believe, lies in the
subtleties of the judge-jury relationship and in the court's realization
of the necessity of preserving its ultimate power of control over the
issue of plaintiff fault.
I suspect that a tally of those instances in which courts have re-
sorted to their power to non-suit or direct verdicts on the issue of
plaintiff carelessness in the area of automobile accidents would not
result in a very impressive list. The characteristic features of traffic
mishaps mentioned above would probably exert their influence upon
judge and jury alike. Also, the ready availability of last chance rules
encourages jury participation in these controversies.
However, there is no discernible reluctance by courts to direct
verdicts on the issue of the plaintiff's carelessness in suits by invitees
against proprietors of business premises. The writer has had occasion
to examine a representative group of about two hundred cases in this
area where contributory negligence was seriously in issue.13 In more
than a third of these disputes the appellate courts had either approved
the trial judge's action in directing a defendant verdict, or had re-
versed a judgment for plaintiff because the trial court had allowed
the controversy to reach the jury on the contributory negligence issue.
I have already ventured my suggestion as to why the ,courts assume
rigorous control in these cases. Issues of duty, negligence, and as-
sumed risk have been too closely intervolved here to justify the
simple expedient of a homely adjustment of damages. I strongly
suspect that the same would hold true in suits against manufacturers
by injured consumers. Whenever misuse of the product by the
claimant is set up as a defense, the problem presented is often a
difficult one requiring a policy determination as to the adaptability
of the product to a market of users some of whom may be inept,
incautious, or ignorant. Fortunately, the rejection-, of negligence as
the basis of recovery in products liability cases should remove any
temptation to mitigate damages because of customer carelessness.
The prospect of a misuse of the product is an appropriate factor for
consideration in determining whether the products is, or is not, "de-
fective."
There is little reason to doubt that an alert judge can effectively




isolate issues of duty and breach of duty, on the one hand, from issues
of contributory negligence, on the other, and the courts will maintain
such jury control as they deem advisable. The fact remains, however,
that an open inauguration of comparative negligence invites a fuller
participation by the jury in the decisional process. It indicates a
tendency to depart from specific limits on liability imposed through
restrictive statements of law formulated by judges, and the substi-
tution therefore of broad formulae administered largely by the lay
juryman.
The same tendency to curtail the judge's law-declaring function and
to enlarge the jury's area of operations finds a dramatic demonstration
in the recent action by the California Supreme Court which virtually
demolishes for that state the entire framework of circumscribed duties
owed those who enter upon the premises of others.' 4 The traditional
classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee-each of which calls
into play its own peculiar context of duties-appear to have been
abolished. The general duty owed to all who enter the premises of
the California proprietor is now characterized as that of reasonable
care. Whether the victim enters as welcome customer, social visitor,
or unwanted trespasser is a matter of importance only as it may serve
to influence the trier of fact as he ponders the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of the defendant's behavior. Here again, as with com-
parative negligence, the law-making power of the judge is subordi-
nated to an individualized judgment tailored to each controversy
under a broad and elastic formula. Although this is a task eminently
suited to the talents of the juryman, yet the importance of the shift
lies not so much in the possible substitution of lay opinion in place
of professional judgment, as in the fact that the discretionary element
in the decisional process is enormously increased as arbitrary rule
yields to broad formula. Thus the change is highly significant even
for the single trier who sits as both judge and jury.
How should we appraise this obvious enhancement of the discre-
tionary element in decisions? Does emphasis on the personal charac-
ter of the judgment indicate a new infusion of "morality" into the
process? Is there thus demonstrated a revived interest in the personal
blameworthiness of the individuals involved in each accident? Or,
on the other hand, does the shift away from rule and toward discre-
tion serve only to highlight the artificiality of what the fault system
has become? By catering more directly to the trier's uninhibited
sense of justice, do we merely give freer play to the instinct that
demands compensation for harm, because the victim is in need and
because machinery is being made available for a distribution of the
14. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
[ VOL, 21
1968] COMMENTS ON MAKI v. FRELK 937
accident costs in diluted form throughout society? Are these lib-
eralizing tendencies merely way stations on the road leading toward
the eventual socialization of risk?
